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What is the relationship between corporate philanthropy and corporate ﬁnancial performance? Some scholars argue thatcorporate philanthropy facilitates stakeholder cooperation and helps secure access to critical resources controlled by
those stakeholders, suggesting that corporate philanthropy should be positively associated with corporate ﬁnancial perfor-
mance. In contrast, other scholars take a negative stance, suggesting that corporate philanthropy diverts valuable corporate
resources and tends to inhibit corporate ﬁnancial performance. Existing empirical studies have not found conclusive evi-
dence on the corporate philanthropy–ﬁnancial performance relationship. Integrating and extending existing perspectives,
this study develops the argument that the relationship between corporate philanthropy and ﬁnancial performance is best cap-
tured by an inverse U-shape. In addition, it posits that the inverse U-shaped relationship varies with the level of dynamism
in ﬁrms’ operational environment. Using a panel data set of 817 ﬁrms listed in the Taft Corporate Giving Directory from
1987 to 1999, we ﬁnd strong support for these arguments.
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In recent years, business corporations have devoted
substantial resources to promoting social welfare and
improving stakeholder relationships. Meanwhile, there
is an important debate among academics about the
relationship between corporate philanthropy and corpo-
rate ﬁnancial performance. Some scholars argue that
corporate philanthropic contributions help to build a
favorable company image in the eyes of stakeholders
(File and Prince 1998, Fry et al. 1982, Haley 1991,
Navarro 1988, Saiia et al. 2003). A positive social image
induces stakeholder support and provides insurance-
like protection for the ﬁrm’s relational assets (Fombrun
et al. 2000, Godfrey 2005, Grifﬁn 2004, Strong 1999),
enabling the ﬁrm to secure critical resources controlled
by stakeholders (Fombrun et al. 2000, Frooman 1999,
Levy and Shatto 1978). Thus, this line of argument sug-
gests that corporate philanthropy should have a positive
effect on corporate ﬁnancial performance.
Conversely, other scholars argue for a negative rela-
tionship between corporate philanthropy and corporate
ﬁnancial performance (Friedman 1970). According to
this argument, managers lack the expertise necessary for
efﬁcient investment in social betterment. As a result,
philanthropic causes should be championed by charita-
ble not-for-proﬁt organizations or individuals, whereas
private ﬁrms should make better use of their valuable
resources to improve their operational efﬁciency. This
argument thus suggests that corporate involvement in
philanthropy generally does not beneﬁt a ﬁrm or its
shareholders, but may only enhance top managers’ per-
sonal reputations in their social circles or enable them to
further their political and career agendas (Barnett 2007,
Friedman 1970, Galaskiewicz 1991, Haley 1991, Werbel
and Carter 2002).
Other arguments suggest that the ﬁnancial conse-
quences of corporate philanthropy may not be deﬁnitive,
because companies may also engage in corporate phi-
lanthropy for reasons without apparent ﬁnancial implica-
tions (Galaskiewicz 1991, Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991,
Marquis et al. 2007). For example, a ﬁrm may involve
itself in philanthropic causes because its top managers
actively participate in the social and civic networks of
the philanthropic elite or associations of ﬁrms that are
active in corporate philanthropy (Galaskiewicz 1991,
Marquis et al. 2007). Furthermore, a ﬁrm may engage
in philanthropic giving simply because its peers in the
same industry do (Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991). In these
cases, institutional pressures at the industry or commu-
nity level shape corporate charitable action, and the rea-
soning often extends beyond a ﬁrm’s immediate proﬁt-
maximization goals.
The empirical evidence on the corporate philan-
thropy–ﬁnancial performance relationship can also be
characterized as inconclusive. Some authors have exam-
ined corporate philanthropy as a component of the larger
domain of corporate social responsibility. For example,
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a meta-analysis by Orlitzky et al. (2003) found that
corporate philanthropy had a positive relationship with
corporate ﬁnancial performance. In contrast, Grifﬁn and
Mahon (1997) and Berman et al. (1999) did not ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant relationship between the two. Similarly,
Berman et al. (1999) found that corporate involvement
in community relations, which includes philanthropic
activities, had little inﬂuence on corporate ﬁnancial per-
formance. A similar pattern of mixed results has been
found in studies purely on corporate philanthropy. For
example, Wokutch and Spencer (1987) found hints of
a positive relationship between corporate philanthropy
and ﬁnancial performance. On the other hand, Seifert
et al. (2004) did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant philanthropy-
performance relationship.
To resolve this empirical inconclusiveness and certain
conceptual confusion found in the literature, we have
undertaken this study to integrate and extend these argu-
ments, and by doing so to provide a more complete
picture of the corporate philanthropy–ﬁnancial perfor-
mance relationship. Based on resource dependence the-
ory, and considering the managerial network and agency
perspectives, we argue that within certain limits, cor-
porate philanthropy helps ﬁrms to secure the critical
resources controlled by various stakeholders and pro-
vides insurance-like protections that reduce the ﬁrms’
exposure to the risk of losing critical resources. As cor-
porate philanthropic contributions increase beyond a cer-
tain level, however, this positive effect will level off
due to constraints on stakeholder support, and it will
be further offset by increased direct costs and agency
costs. Thus, the corporate philanthropy–ﬁnancial perfor-
mance relationship might best be described as an inverse
U-shape, i.e., an increase in corporate philanthropy to a
certain level is beneﬁcial for ﬁnancial performance, but
after that level ﬁnancial performance should level off
and eventually decline.
Moreover, we argue that the beneﬁts of corporate
philanthropy will vary with the level of dynamism in
a ﬁrm’s operating environment. In a highly dynamic
environment, the ﬁrm is likely to be more depen-
dent on stakeholders for critical resources (Berman
et al. 1999, 2005; Frooman 1999). In addition, cor-
porate philanthropy functions as a more salient and
reliable signal of a positive ﬁrm image and repu-
tation among stakeholders, which in such situations
facilitates corporate control of critical resources. As
a result, environmental dynamism may complicate the
hypothesized philanthropy-performance relationship. In
a dynamic environment, the inverse U-shaped cor-
porate philanthropy–ﬁnancial performance relationship
may change such that the same level of corporate phi-
lanthropy corresponds to a higher level of ﬁnancial per-
formance than it would in a less dynamic environment.
Theory and Hypotheses
Corporate philanthropy is generally considered a com-
ponent of the larger domain of corporate social respon-
sibility. It is, by deﬁnition, gifts given by corporations
to social and charitable causes, such as support for
education, culture, or the arts; minorities or health
care; or for relief funds for victims of natural disasters
(Godfrey 2005, Seifert et al. 2004). Corporate philan-
thropy often extends beyond areas that are directly asso-
ciated with a corporation’s economic activities or legal
requirements. Among the four levels of corporate social
responsibility identiﬁed by Carroll (1979)—economic,
legal, ethical, and discretionary—corporate philanthropy
ﬁts within the discretionary category. Therefore, while
there are growing social expectations that ﬁrms be more
active in charitable causes, philanthropic contributions
are generally described as purely voluntary (Hemingway
and Maclagan 2004), and decisions concerning corpo-
rate philanthropy are often at management’s discretion
(Buchholtz et al. 1999, Carroll 1979).
Increasing stakeholder expectations for corporate phi-
lanthropy suggest that whether and to what extent a
ﬁrm engages in charitable causes will have an impact
on how stakeholders relate to the ﬁrm, which may in
turn have effects on ﬁrm ﬁnancial outcomes. Further-
more, to the extent that endorsing philanthropic causes
is at the discretion of managers, the role of these man-
agers should be taken into consideration foster to a
more comprehensive understanding of the relationship
between corporate philanthropy and corporate ﬁnancial
performance. In the remainder of this section, we shall
integrate these perspectives and develop the argument
that the philanthropy–ﬁnancial performance relationship
can best be captured as an inverse U-shape.
The Beneﬁts of Corporate Philanthropy
To the extent that corporate philanthropy is prompted by
the demands of socially conscious individuals, at least
some of whom are stakeholders of concern to the
ﬁrm, the relationship between corporate philanthropy
and ﬁnancial performance should be placed in the con-
text of interaction between the ﬁrm (or the ﬁrm’s top
managers) and its stakeholders. Resource dependence
theory is helpful in this regard because it emphasizes
the impact of actors external to the ﬁrm on organiza-
tional decision making and its consequences (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). The theory suggests that because the
allocation and use of the resources necessary for a ﬁrm’s
continued survival are often not fully controlled by the
ﬁrm, but rather by some key stakeholders, the ﬁrm faces
uncertainty in securing those resources (Frooman 1999,
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). A ﬁrm thus should be con-
cerned with addressing the concerns of its stakehold-
ers to reduce the uncertainty associated with obtaining
critical resources (Frooman 1999, Oliver 1991, Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978). This view largely agrees with more
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recent developments in discussions of stakeholder man-
agement, which suggest that a ﬁrm may take an instru-
mental approach to stakeholders to manage their impact,
on the overall objectives of the ﬁrm (Berman et al. 1999,
Freeman 1984, Jones 1995). Furthermore, to the extent
that philanthropic activities are at the discretion of man-
agers, top managers play an important role in facilitating
the beneﬁts a ﬁrm obtains from corporate philanthropy.
Resource Dependence and Corporate Philanthropy.
Viewed from a resource dependence perspective, corpo-
rate philanthropy can be regarded as a means by which a
ﬁrm can reduce the risks associated with resource acqui-
sition (Berman et al. 1999, 2005; Haley 1991). As cor-
porate philanthropy enhances a ﬁrm’s public image, the
ﬁrm’s key stakeholders, including current and prospec-
tive employees, customers, suppliers, shareholders, and
the community are likely to feel more positively about
being associated with such a ﬁrm and thus more will-
ing to cooperate by providing resources (Backhaus et al.
2002, Dutton et al. 1994, Frooman 1999). For exam-
ple, it has been demonstrated that employees show
greater commitment to a ﬁrm that has a good public
image in supplying human capital (Dutton et al. 1994).
Moreover, such ﬁrms are often perceived as an attrac-
tive employer by job seekers (Backhaus et al. 2002,
Greening and Turban 2000, Turban and Greening 1996).
Customers may respond to corporate philanthropy by
increasing their demand for the ﬁrm’s products or ser-
vices, or by paying premium prices (Bhattacharya and
Sen 2003). Furthermore, some investors, particularly cer-
tain institutional ones, are more willing to invest in ﬁrms
known for pursuing corporate philanthropy (Barnett and
Salomon 2006, Graves and Waddock 1994, Johnson and
Greening 1999). This is evidenced by the steady demand
for mutual funds that specialize in ﬁrms that meet cer-
tain social criteria, including philanthropic contributions.
In addition, local communities may provide a philan-
thropic ﬁrm with tax breaks or favorable terms for using
local infrastructure. Therefore, we propose that corpo-
rate philanthropy can function as a means for ﬁrms to
secure the acquisition of critical resources controlled by
stakeholders.
In addition to helping a ﬁrm secure the acquisition of
new resources, corporate philanthropy may help a ﬁrm
to reduce the risk of losing resources it already con-
trols (Barnett and Salomon 2006; Brammer and Milling-
ton 2004a, b, 2005; Godfrey 2005). For example, a
ﬁrm sometimes cannot avoid incidents that may cre-
ate negative consequences for some of its stakehold-
ers (Grifﬁn 2004). A ﬁrm’s product may be discovered
to contain materials that endanger consumer health; the
closure of a plant may lead to the layoff of employ-
ees; or the termination of a joint project with a sup-
plier may directly reduce the supplier’s expected returns.
When such incidents occur, the ﬁrm risks losing the
resource commitments and other support of its stake-
holders (Godfrey 2005). However, a ﬁrm’s prior invest-
ments in philanthropy can help to maintain valuable
goodwill that offsets or ameliorates negative publicity
(Barnett and Salomon 2006). Therefore, a reputation for
corporate philanthropy can help protect a ﬁrm’s relation-
ships with its stakeholders, and thus reduce the ﬁrm’s
risk of losing critical resources (Fombrun et al. 2000,
Godfrey 2005, Strong 1999).
The Role of Top Managers. Top managers make their
strategic choices partly in response to external pres-
sures and expectations (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987,
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In particular, managers use
their discretion to structure an organization’s relation-
ships with its stakeholders to mitigate the pressures cre-
ated by resource dependency (Oliver 1991, Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). With respect to corporate philanthropy,
in addition to their direct involvement in decision mak-
ing on philanthropic contributions (Werbel and Carter
2002), top managers serve as a vehicle to enhance the
image or reputation building and signaling effects of cor-
porate philanthropy.
These arguments are built on the assumption that the
stakeholders have information about the ﬁrm’s philan-
thropic contributions. However, because the stakeholders
are not necessarily themselves the direct beneﬁciaries
of corporate philanthropy, many of them may not be
fully aware of the extent to which a ﬁrm engages in
charitable giving. We argue that managers may be able
to play an important role in publicizing their ﬁrms’
active commitment to a social agenda (Galaskiewicz
1991). For example, they can seek public recognition
of their ﬁrms’ involvement in philanthropic causes by
actively joining the social and civic networks of the phil-
anthropic elite or participating in associations of ﬁrms
that are active in corporate philanthropy (Galaskiewicz
1991). Furthermore, top managers may promote the pro-
fessional management of corporate philanthropic activ-
ities by creating a specialized department (Brammer
and Millington 2003) and hiring professional managers
(Saiia et al. 2003). Professional managers or a special-
ized department exclusively devoted to corporate phi-
lanthropy may contribute to a higher regard for the
ﬁrm’s philanthropy among the community and other key
stakeholders.
Corporate philanthropy can thus be considered an
active attempt by a ﬁrm and its managers’ to exer-
cise inﬂuence over the allocation and control of critical
resources. The enhanced reputation resulting from cor-
porate philanthropy is likely to contribute to a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial performance by enabling the ﬁrm to secure
high-quality resources necessary for its survival and to
take full advantage of those resources (Oliver 1991).
Furthermore, top managers may be able to amplify the
beneﬁts by increasing the visibility of the ﬁrm’s philan-
thropic activities to its stakeholders.
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The Costs of Corporate Philanthropy
Corporate philanthropy, by deﬁnition, imposes a direct
cost on the ﬁrm (Barnett and Salomon 2006, Ullmann
1985). These costs often include the diversion of
valuable corporate resources such as cash, products,
and facilities. In addition, corporate philanthropy may
increase human resource costs. For example, as the level
of corporate philanthropy increases, many ﬁrms ﬁnd the
need to establish independent departments devoted to
corporate charitable programs (Brammer and Millington
2003, McWilliams and Siegel 2001, Saiia et al. 2003).
Many corporate philanthropy programs also involve time
and effort on the part of employees. Such practices
are likely to increase the ﬁrms’ overall human resource
and administrative costs. These additional costs directly
detract from the bottom line, and so can place ﬁrms
active in corporate philanthropy at a competitive disad-
vantage relative to those who do not engage in such
practices (Friedman 1970, Jensen 2002).
The costs of corporate philanthropy, however, may
not be limited to such expenditures. According to the
key argument of agency theory, managers may act in
their own best interests, but at the expense of the ﬁrm’s
owners and other stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling
1976).1 As a result, the various costs involved in agency
relationships may often be very high, and the eco-
nomic well-being of parties involved in the relationship
may be damaged unless managerial misbehavior can be
effectively constrained (Eisenhardt 1989, Jensen 1986,
Jones 1995). In the case of corporate philanthropy, the
potential for a conﬂict of goals between managers and
stakeholders is likely to be salient. Although managerial
discretion in corporate philanthropy may enable man-
agers to act so as to enhance the beneﬁts, it is equally
reasonable to suspect that managerial discretion enables
some top managers to use corporate philanthropy to
enhance personal reputations within social circles or to
further political or career agendas at the expense of the
ﬁrm and its other stakeholders (Friedman 1970). In addi-
tion, to the extent that stakeholders believe that managers
are not properly attending to their interests, they may
respond by withholding resources and support, or by
applying more strict control mechanisms such as strin-
gent contracts and monitoring devices, which could con-
stitute another form of agency cost.
An active involvement in corporate philanthropy may
also send a signal to stakeholders that a ﬁrm has a
large pool of slack resources (Preston and O’Bannon
1997, Seifert et al. 2004). Stakeholders are likely to real-
ize that in such a situation managers may engage in
opportunistic decision making not conﬁned to corporate
philanthropy (e.g., empire building through diversiﬁca-
tion). A key argument of the agency theory suggests that
cash-rich businesses are more prone to agency hazards
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Although managers’ poten-
tial misconduct in other areas is not a direct cost of cor-
porate philanthropy, to the extent that investors and other
stakeholders associate philanthropic contributions with
excessive corporate resources and thus a higher possi-
bility of managerial misbehavior, they will again be less
willing to cooperate with the ﬁrm and more likely to
withhold critical resources.
The Curvilinear Relationship Between Corporate
Philanthropy and Financial Performance
So far the discussion suggests that the actual relation-
ship between corporate philanthropy and ﬁnancial per-
formance is more complex than the simple positive,
negative, or neutral one that many previous studies
have assumed. Analyzing the likely trends of the spe-
ciﬁc beneﬁts and costs and integrating these opposing
effects yields a new vantage point from which an inverse
U-shaped relationship between corporate philanthropy
and corporate ﬁnancial performance emerges.
The beneﬁts of corporate philanthropy are expected to
increase, at ﬁrst due to positive stakeholder responses as
well as the effect of organizational learning in the admin-
istration of philanthropic activities. However, increases
in beneﬁts (i.e., the slope of the curve for the total
beneﬁts of corporate philanthropy) would be expected
to gradually level off for several reasons. First, despite
stakeholders’ willingness to support corporate charita-
ble causes, there are limits to the amount and type of
resources that these socially conscious stakeholders are
able to control and thus potentially provide to the ﬁrm.
These limitations put a natural constraint on the amount
of beneﬁt a ﬁrm can obtain from corporate philanthropy.
Second, even if we were to assume that stakeholders are
able to provide unlimited resources, a linear increase in
the beneﬁts remains very unlikely. When a ﬁrm invests
excessively in corporate philanthropy, it may inevitably
transfer some portion of these expenditures to its stake-
holders in the forms of, for example, higher product
prices, lower wages, or lower returns from their ﬁnancial
investments (McWilliams and Siegel 2001). Although
socially conscious stakeholders are willing to sacriﬁce
part of their ﬁnancial wealth to support charitable ﬁrms,
they nevertheless expect reasonable returns from their
ﬁnancial or human capital investments. With successive
increases in corporate philanthropy, these stakeholders
must, at some point, become unwilling to accept terms
that continue to lower their ﬁnancial returns, and thus
start to withdraw from investing their resources in the
ﬁrm.
The marginal beneﬁt of corporate philanthropy should,
therefore, eventually decrease as the amount of philan-
thropic contributions increases. As shown by curve A
in Figure 1, the total beneﬁts of corporate philanthropy
will rise more slowly with each increase in philanthropic
contributions.
The direct cost of corporate philanthropy, approxi-
mated as curve B, should increase at least dollar by
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Figure 1 The Hypothesized Curvilinear Relationship Between Corporate Philanthropy and Corporate Financial Performance
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dollar with the amount of philanthropic monetary dona-
tions. Human resource and administrative costs may
not increase linearly due to economies of scale as well
as learning effects in the management of philanthropic
activities (McWilliams and Siegel 2001). Taken together,
the direct cost of corporate philanthropy is illustrated as
curve B, which is close to linear, but gradually levels off
with increasing philanthropic contributions.
Conversely, agency costs in terms of stakeholders’
concerns about managerial misconduct are likely to be
minimal at low levels of philanthropic contribution, but
they would be expected to become more signiﬁcant with
increased philanthropy. When philanthropic contribu-
tions become excessive or go beyond the levels that key
stakeholders can tolerate, they create greater concerns
about the potential for misuse of corporate resources
by managers. However, such agency costs should level
off eventually, because extreme managerial misconduct
is likely to be curbed by corporate control mechanisms
such as monitoring and bonding, or even the replacement
of the managers. Thus, agency costs would be expected
to increase beyond a certain level of corporate philan-
thropy, but then level off gradually, demonstrating an
approximate S shape (curve C).
Considering these countervailing forces simultane-
ously, an inverse U-shaped curvilinear relationship
between corporate philanthropy and ﬁnancial perfor-
mance should emerge (curve D). Within certain limits,
corporate philanthropy will help the ﬁrm secure crit-
ical resources controlled by various stakeholders and
provide insurance-like protections that reduce the ﬁrm’s
exposure to the risk of losing critical resources. As
corporate philanthropic contributions increase beyond
a sufﬁciently high level, however, this positive effect
will level off due to limits on stakeholder support, and
increased direct costs and agency costs.
Hypothesis 1. Corporate philanthropy and corpo-
rate ﬁnancial performance have an inverse U-shaped
curvilinear relationship.
The Moderating Effect of Environmental Dynamism
Environmental dynamism is the level of turbulence or
instability in the competitive environment that increases
the unpredictability of a ﬁrm’s operational and ﬁnancial
outcomes (Boyd 1990, Dess and Beard 1984). We pro-
pose that environmental dynamism moderates the effects
of corporate philanthropy on ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance,
and thus inﬂuences the shape of the philanthropy-
performance relationship, for the following reasons:
First, according to resource dependence theory, envi-
ronmental dynamism is a key component of environ-
mental uncertainty, which is positively related to the
dependence of a ﬁrm on its stakeholders for critical
resources (Goll and Rasheed 2004, Pfeffer and Salancik
1978). When the environment is highly dynamic, it is
more difﬁcult to predict the impact on the ﬁrm of a
future state of the environment or of any environmen-
tal change (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, Milliken 1987).
The unpredictable ebbs and ﬂows of a dynamic environ-
ment increase the difﬁculty of securing a stable inﬂow
of critical resources. Thus, greater relational ﬂexibility
and closer engagement with stakeholders become more
crucial for exerting inﬂuence over stakeholders’ deci-
sions about resource allocation and use (Berman et al.
1999, 2005; Frooman 1999). In a turbulent environment,
therefore, the ability of corporate philanthropy to ensure
resource acquisition is likely to have greater value.
Wang et al.: Untangling the Relationship Between Corporate Philanthropy and Firm Financial Performance
148 Organization Science 19(1), pp. 143–159, © 2008 INFORMS
Second, a ﬁrm operating in a turbulent environment
is more often exposed to unexpected events with nega-
tive consequences for some stakeholder groups. As such
events occur more frequently, stakeholders become more
likely to withdraw their loyalty to and cooperation with
the ﬁrm, which will aggravate the difﬁculties of secur-
ing critical resources. In this situation, a positive public
image resulting from corporate philanthropy should help
the ﬁrm overcome these negative consequences (Godfrey
2005). Therefore, as environmental dynamism increases,
the role of corporate philanthropy in protecting ﬁrms
from losing control of their resources and from losing
the support of stakeholders increases in importance.
Last, a dynamic environment is often associated
with information-processing difﬁculties for stakehold-
ers (Milliken 1987). In a stable environment, stake-
holders often have diverse and more reliable avenues
to obtain information about the ﬁrm’s qualiﬁcations to
determine whether they should establish a relationship
with that ﬁrm. For example, a ﬁrm’s willingness to honor
implicit contracts with its stakeholders, an important fac-
tor to consider in cooperative relationships, can best be
evaluated based on the ﬁrm’s past behavior in simi-
lar situations. Moreover, explicit contractual means are
available to help secure transaction partners’ beneﬁts. As
the environment becomes more unpredictable, however,
stakeholders will have few clear evaluation criteria to
accurately predict ﬁrm behavior. In addition, they cannot
rely entirely on explicit contractual means, because con-
tracts are more likely to be incomplete due to the unpre-
dictability of the situation (Hart 1995). In this setting, as
other evaluation criteria become less available and less
reliable, corporate philanthropy may function as a more
salient signal to stakeholders about a ﬁrm’s fundamen-
tal values and behavioral patterns (Godfrey 2005). When
this signal is well received by the stakeholders, the ﬁrm
is likely to receive stakeholder support and obtain an
advantage in gaining access to the resources controlled
by these stakeholders.
For these reasons, we propose that, in a highly dy-
namic environment, corporate philanthropy increases a
ﬁrm’s likelihood of survival and enables it to achieve
greater ﬁnancial success. In contrast, it is unlikely that
environmental dynamism will have an impact on the
direct costs associated with corporate philanthropy. It
may affect the agency costs of excessive corporate phi-
lanthropy (i.e., the costs of reduced stakeholder will-
ingness to provide critical resources) in both positive
and negative ways, rendering the net effect unclear.
We might expect that in a highly dynamic environ-
ment investors and other stakeholders would be more
likely to associate corporate philanthropy with a higher
likelihood of managerial misconduct, and thus greater
agency costs. In particular, environmental dynamism
increases information-gathering difﬁculties. A ﬁrm’s
senior managers always have better information than
outsiders about the ﬁrm, so the ﬁrm’s board often
ﬁnds it necessary to grant managers greater discre-
tion in decision making in turbulent times (Galbraith
1973). Agency theorists have observed that although
it increases information-processing capacity, granting
managers greater discretion generates additional costs
related to the inherently opportunistic behavior of man-
agers (Jensen and Meckling 1992, Malone and Crowston
1994). A turbulent environment usually requires more
resources to deal with unexpected incidents, so ﬁrms
in dynamic industries are less likely to enjoy a large
amount of free resources. Managers may have greater
scope to misbehave in a dynamic environment, but they
may be constrained by limited resources. In contrast,
ﬁrms in stable industries are likely to be rich in slack
resources, (Farrell 2001) giving senior managers more
opportunitis to engage in corporate philanthropy to serve
their own interests. Taken together, these arguments sug-
gest that environmental dynamism can inﬂuence the
costs associated with corporate philanthropy in various,
offsetting ways.
In summary, in a highly dynamic environment, cor-
porate philanthropy plays a more crucial role in secur-
ing critical resources, resulting in a greater ﬁnancial
beneﬁt from corporate philanthropy. However, the costs
associated with corporate philanthropy may not change
signiﬁcantly. Overall, these arguments suggest that the
positive effects of corporate philanthropy on a ﬁrm’s
performance should become more pronounced in highly
dynamic environments, and that the inverse U-shaped
curve will be expected to demonstrate a steeper upward
curvature and a higher plateau.
Hypothesis 2. Environmental dynamism moderates
the inverse U-shaped corporate philanthropy–ﬁnancial
performance relationship in such a way that the same
level of corporate philanthropy corresponds to a higher
level of ﬁnancial performance when the industry’s envi-
ronment is more dynamic.
Methods
Data and Sample
Two main data sources were used for this study: Taft
Corporate Giving Directories and Standard & Poor’s
COMPUSTAT. The Taft Corporate Giving Directories,
provided information on corporate philanthropy. The
ﬁrst edition of the directory was published in the late
1970s, and a new edition has been added in each subse-
quent year. Each edition of the directory provides com-
plete proﬁles of about 1,000 of the largest corporate
direct giving programs and corporate-sponsored foun-
dations in the United States, including information on
speciﬁc giving in dollars, corporate direct gifts, nonmon-
etary gifts, matching gifts, and corporate sponsorships,
when available. To be listed in the directory, programs
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and foundations must give at least $200,000 per year
in cash and nonmonetary gifts combined. (Before 1996,
the minimum requirement was $250,000.) To avoid the
potential inﬂuence of major U.S. tax code changes in
1986, data were collected starting in 1987 and then con-
tinuously for 13 years up to 1999.
This corporate-giving information was then merged
with the Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT series to
obtain ﬁnancial information about the companies in the
data set. Because company identiﬁcation numbers that
could have been used to accurately match the COM-
PUSTAT data were not available in the Taft Corporate
Giving Directories, the two databases were matched by
company name, with a manual check of each match to
ensure accuracy. Private ﬁrms or public ﬁrms not cov-
ered by the COMPUSTAT series were excluded from
the analysis. To minimize the potential inﬂuence of
factors that are difﬁcult to control for, we excluded
ﬁrms that went public during the sample period and
those that went bankrupt, or merged, or were acquired
by other ﬁrms. After further deleting ﬁrms with key
dependent or explanatory variables missing in the COM-
PUSTAT series, the ﬁnal panel data set included 817
companies and 4,019 ﬁrm-year observations over the
sample period.2
Each of the ﬁrm-year observations was then matched
to an industry peer that did not appear in the directo-
ries. Following previous research (e.g., Barber and Lyon
1996), each matched peer was a publicly traded ﬁrm
drawn from the same three-digit SIC code as the sam-
ple ﬁrm, and was within 70% to 130% of the sample
ﬁrm’s asset size in the observation year. If more than
one ﬁrm satisﬁed the above criteria for a match, the one
with asset size closest to the sample ﬁrm was chosen.
These peers formed a control group to be used to deal
with potential sample selection bias (Heckman 1979).
Measurements
Two measures of corporate ﬁnancial performance were
employed: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q. ROA
is a common accounting-based measure, deﬁned as net
income over total assets. Because there is often a lag
between corporate giving and its impact on accounting-
based performance, the effect of corporate giving was
evaluated in terms of subsequent ROA, which is the
average ROA of the three years following the giving
year. To improve conﬁdence in the results, we used
another market-based ﬁnancial performance measure as
a dependent variable: Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q was approxi-
mated as the ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio, which explains
more than 96% of the variance in a more sophisti-
cated Tobin’s q that would require arbitrary assumptions
about depreciation and inﬂation rates for the calculation
of the assets’ replacement values (e.g., Lindenberg and
Ross 1981). The market value numerator was the year-
end market value of the ﬁrm’s common stock plus the
book value of preferred stock and debt, and the book
value denominator was year-end total assets. Use of a
ﬁrm’s market value for the numerator was based on
the assumption that stock market investors hold rational
expectations about the extent to which the present value
of a ﬁrm’s future proﬁts varies with the ﬁrm’s actions
taken today. Evidence that a ﬁrm’s charitable giving is
correlated with market value would suggest that a ﬁrm’s
future returns are correlated with corporate giving today.
Similar to ROA, Tobin’s q was calculated by averaging
data of the subsequent three years from the year of giv-
ing. The data source for both ROA and Tobin’s q was
the COMPUSTAT series.
The key independent variable, the level of corpo-
rate philanthropy, was assessed by the dollar amount of
charitable giving by a ﬁrm in a given year, scaled by
the ﬁrm’s sales in the same period. Such scaling was
adopted to control for the effects of ﬁrm size, because
larger ﬁrms are generally better able to support higher
levels of corporate charitable contributions than smaller
ﬁrms (Stanwick and Stanwick 1998). It was, therefore,
a measure of the relative amount of giving. The dol-
lar amount of charitable giving was reported in the Taft
Corporate Giving Directories, which included monetary
and nonmonetary giving, as well as direct giving and
giving through corporate-sponsored foundations.
The moderating variable, environmental dynamism,
was measured using industry-level objective informa-
tion. Following the methods of previous studies (e.g.,
Dess and Beard 1984), we regressed industry sales over
the ﬁve years preceding the giving year (including the
giving year) against time, and used the standard error
of the regression coefﬁcient related to a time dummy
variable divided by the average value of the indus-
try’s sales to create a standardized index of industry
dynamism. Information on industry sales is published
by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis. For a diversiﬁed ﬁrm that operated in
more than one industry, overall industry sales were ﬁrst
computed as the average of the segment industry–level
sales, weighted by segment sales as a proportion of the
ﬁrm’s total sales (Villalonga 2004). The overall industry
sales were then regressed over the same ﬁve-year period.
A few key control variables were lagged corporate
ﬁnancial performance, ﬁrm-level R&D, and advertising
intensities. Including a lagged dependent variable in a
regression is a common approach (e.g., Beck and Katz
1995) used to reduce the serial correlation of errors
often present in pooled time-series cross-sectional panel
data. Previous research has demonstrated that invest-
ments in research and development (R&D) are a cru-
cial input for generating intangible knowledge assets or
innovations (Griliches 1979, Hall 1999), which enable
ﬁrms to achieve higher ﬁnancial performance. In addi-
tion to R&D, advertising is considered another key fac-
tor that helps create intangible assets that positively
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affect a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance (e.g., Hirschey
and Weygandt 1985, Morck and Yeung 1991). In par-
ticular, advertising may serve as a proxy for prod-
uct differentiation and entry barriers that enhance ﬁrm
proﬁtability (McWilliams and Siegel 2000). R&D and
advertising intensities were measured in terms of the
amount of R&D and advertising expenditure; each was
scaled by total ﬁrm sales. The data source for all these
variables was COMPUSTAT.
Firm size, ﬁrm age, and debt ratio were also included
as control variables. Previous research has established
that ﬁrm size plays an important role in explaining mar-
ket returns (Fama and French 1992). Corporate gover-
nance theory predicts that leverage (debt ratio) affects
agency costs and thereby inﬂuences ﬁrm performance
(Jensen 1986). These two variables have been included
in some other studies of the social performance–ﬁnancial
performance link (e.g., Seifert et al. 2004, Ullmann
1985, Waddock and Graves 1997). Firm age may inﬂu-
ence ﬁnancial performance because it captures differ-
ences in ﬁrm competitiveness associated with history.
Also, older ﬁrms may have more agency conﬂicts,
which in turn affect ﬁnancial performance (Claessens
and Djankov 1999). Given the evident positive skewness
in ﬁrm size, the natural logarithm of total assets was
used as a proxy for ﬁrm size. Firm age was measured
as the number of years since the ﬁrm’s initial public
offering, or the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst listing in COMPUSTAT. Debt
ratio was measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total
assets.
All the above control variables were included in the
ﬁrst-stage probit model to predict the likelihood that a
ﬁrm will engage in charitable contributions, but all were
lagged by one additional year. Previous studies have
linked ﬁrm size with corporate philanthropy because
large ﬁrms have greater visibility, which would attract
more scrutiny and a higher standard for charitable con-
tributions (Adams and Hardwick 1998, Brammer and
Millington 2004a, Saiia et al. 2003, Seifert et al. 2004).
The same argument can be applied to ﬁrm age, because
older ﬁrms would be expected to be more well known
and thus to have greater visibility. A ﬁrm’s debt ratio
reﬂects the ﬁnancial constraints on its managers to min-
imize discretionary expenditures such as philanthropic
giving to ensure the continuing support of debt holders
(Adams and Hardwick 1998, Brammer and Millington
2004a, Navarro 1988). Because corporate philanthropy
is often considered a form of advertising that enhances
ﬁrm image and reputation (Brammer and Millington
2004b, Seifert et al. 2004), ﬁrms with a greater need
for advertising (higher advertising expenditure) should
also be more likely to engage in corporate philanthropy.
In addition, a good company image is generally more
valuable for ﬁrms with differentiated and highly inno-
vative products or services, which are often the results
of R&D investments (McWilliams and Siegel 2000).
Therefore, to the extent that corporate philanthropy helps
improve company image and reputation, R&D–intensive
ﬁrms should be more likely to engage in corporate
philanthropy.
Also included in the ﬁrst–stage equation of the
Heckman model were slack resources, industry-
level giving, and industry dummy variables. Previous
researchers have argued that the magnitude of a ﬁrm’s
slack resources is an important determinant of its cor-
porate philanthropy (Brammer and Millington 2004b,
Buchholtz et al. 1999, Seifert et al. 2004). Following
Bourgeois (1981) and Singh (1986), each ﬁrm’s current
ratio (i.e., current assets divided by current liabilities)
was taken as an indicator of its slack resources. A ﬁrm’s
charitable contributions could be affected by those of
its peers in the same industry (Galaskiewicz and Burt
1991); thus, industry-level contributions were controlled
for. This variable was calculated as the average amount
given in each industry. Industry dummies were included
in the regression because earlier research (e.g., Seifert
et al. 2004) had shown that clear differences in cor-
porate philanthropy exist among industries. Note that
these industry-level control variables were not included
in the second-stage models, because the measures of the
second-stage dependent variable (ROA and Tobin’s q)
were industry mean-adjusted, and thus were less likely
to be inﬂuenced by industry effects.
Estimation Method
The following equation was used to test the hypotheses:
t+1 = 0+1t +2Givingt +3Giving2t
+4Dynamismt +5Givingt ∗Dynamismt
+6Giving2t ∗Dynamismt +7Xt + t
where t+1 and t are corporate ﬁnancial performance
and its lagged value. X is a set of other control variables
that are expected to have a bearing on corporate ﬁnancial
performance. Giving is a continuous variable that repre-
sents the level of giving for each ﬁrm-year observation.
Dynamism represents the level of industry dynamism.
0 to 7 are the parameters to be estimated, and  is an
error term.
One main question of interest was whether the coef-
ﬁcient of Giving 	2
 and the other coefﬁcients associ-
ated with Giving (3, 5, and 6
 measured a real effect
of the levels of charitable giving on corporate ﬁnancial
performance. Because our sample was conﬁned to ﬁrms
that were reported in the Taft Corporate Giving Direc-
tories, the test of the hypothesized relationship between
charitable contributions and corporate ﬁnancial perfor-
mance was limited to ﬁrms that engage in charitable
giving. Simply regressing with this sample of ﬁrms that
engaged in charitable contributions would not be appro-
priate, because ﬁrms that gave may well have had dif-
ferent characteristics from those that did not (or did not
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give enough to be listed in the directory). Thus, it is
possible that factors that affect whether ﬁrms engage in
charitable giving could be correlated with the depen-
dent variable, the ﬁnancial performance of the ﬁrm. This
suggests that the coefﬁcients of the terms associated with
Giving would be correlated with the error term, and thus
the ordinary least squares (OLS) or generalized least
squares (GLS) estimates of those coefﬁcients would be
biased.
To avoid any such sample selection bias, the effect
of charitable contributions on corporate ﬁnancial per-
formance was estimated using the Heckman selection
model (Heckman 1979). The Heckman model includes
two equations: The ﬁrst (selection) equation estimates
the likelihood of ﬁrms’ engaging in charitable contribu-
tions by applying a probit model to the entire sample of
ﬁrms, including ﬁrms in both the main sample and those
in a control group. At this stage, an adjustment term
called the “inverse Mills ratio” or “correction for selec-
tion 	
” is calculated. In the second equation, the sam-
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrices
Panel A: Heckman ﬁrst-stage variables
Variables Mean s. d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent variable at t
1. Giving choice dummy 0501 0499
Independent variables at t−1
2. Slack resources 1591 0782 017∗
3. R&D 0013 0030 014∗ 008∗
4. Advertising 0011 0038 006∗ 006∗ 007∗
5. Firm size 7864 1567 015∗ −016∗ −000 −011∗
6. Age 2124 1129 010∗ −021∗ 001 001 042∗
7. Debt ratio 0660 0221 −004∗ −035∗ −021∗ −007∗ 024∗ 012∗
8. Industry level of giving 0001 0006 005∗ 005∗ 006∗ 002 −007∗ −012∗ −002
∗ Signiﬁcant at the p < 005 level; N = 8038.
Panel B: Heckman second-stage variables
Variables Mean s. d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Dependent variables at t+1a
1. ROA 0019 0073
2. Tobin’s qb 0309 1181 049∗
Independent variables at t
3. ROA 0019 0075 079∗ 043∗
4. Tobin’s qb 0298 1094 045∗ 081∗ 050∗
5. Amount of giving/sales 0 0004 002 003∗ 001 003∗
6. R&D 0017 0032 008∗ 024∗ 009∗ 020∗ 010∗
7. Advertising 0015 0040 011∗ 015∗ 013∗ 016∗ 000 008∗
8. Firm size 8042 1541 −004∗ −003∗ −006 −005∗ −003∗ 000 −012∗
9. Age 2317 1242 −006∗ −000 −008∗ −000 −002∗ −001 −002 041∗
10. Debt ratio 0652 0211 −012∗ −006∗ −019 −007∗ −003∗ −018∗ −007∗ 024∗ 013∗
11. Industry dynamism 0 0020 −003∗ −002 −004∗ −001 000 −006∗ 001 −006∗ 001 007∗
12. Inverse Mills 0695 0261 −002 −011∗ −002∗ −010∗ −002 −028∗ −022∗ −031∗ −032∗ 007∗ 0.02
ratio (ROA)
13. Inverse Mills 0709 0258 −002∗ −010∗ −002∗ −009∗ −002 −026∗ −023∗ −035∗ −033∗ 006∗ 0.02 085∗
ratio (Tobin’s q)
a Calculated by averaging the values for years in t+1, t+2, and t+3; b: N = 3997.
∗ Signiﬁcant at the p < 005 level; N = 4019.
ple is limited to the main sample of ﬁrms that engage in
charitable giving. In this equation, the corporate ﬁnancial
performance model is reestimated with the “correction
for selection” included as a control variable (Heckman
1979). Therefore, the Heckman two-stage model corrects
for sample selection bias because parameter estimates
from the ﬁrst-stage probit model, which are based on
information that represents all ﬁrms in the population,
are incorporated in the second stage.
Note that while the second stage of a Heckman model
is generally an OLS regression, using OLS to estimate
panel data could result in biased estimates due to the
potential presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrela-
tion (Greene 1997). We invoked two measures to address
these concerns. First, as was mentioned earlier, including
a lagged dependent variable in the regression reduced the
inﬂuence of autocorrelation. Second, we ran the regres-
sion with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to
deal with panel heteroscedasticity and potential contem-
poraneous error correlation.3
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Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlation
matrices for the main variables used in the study. Panel
A includes the variables used in the ﬁrst-stage probit
model of the two-stage Heckman analysis. As would
be expected, the level of slack resources was signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with a ﬁrm’s likelihood of engaging
in corporate charitable giving. In addition, R&D, adver-
tising, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, and the industry’s level of
giving were found to have a positive correlation with
the likelihood of giving, but ﬁrm debt ratio had a nega-
tive correlation. The descriptive statistics and correlation
matrix for key variables used in the second stage of the
Heckman analysis are presented in Panel B. The corre-
lations between the level of charitable giving and subse-
quent performance measures (ROA and Tobin’s q) were
small (ranging from 0.02 to 0.03), although the signs
were positive. Industry dynamism was not found to have
a signiﬁcant correlation with subsequent Tobin’s q, but
was negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with ROA.
First-Stage Giving Choice Estimates
Table 2 shows the results of the ﬁrst-stage Heckman
selection model, which was a probit regression of giv-
ing choice against factors thought to affect whether a
ﬁrm chooses to engage in corporate giving. The depen-
dent variable was a dummy variable indicating whether
Table 2 Probit Estimates from a Heckman First-Stage Sample
Selection Modela (Regression of Giving Choice at t on
Firm and Industry Descriptors at t−1)
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
Intercept −2178∗∗∗ −2369∗∗∗
0129	 0158	
Slack resources 0072∗∗∗ 0118∗∗∗
0017	 0019	
Size 0201∗∗∗ 0198∗∗∗
0009	 0009	
Age 0005∗∗∗ 0005∗∗∗
0001	 0001	
R&D intensity 5317∗∗∗ 4659∗∗∗
0471	 0490	
Debt ratio −0159∗ −0119∗
0068	 0058	
Advertising 1872∗∗∗ 2109∗∗∗
0291	 0448	
Industry giving 7824∗∗∗
2369	
2-digit SIC classiﬁcation ∗∗∗
N 8,038 8,038
Log likelihood (LL) −66597 −63311
Deviance (−2LL or 2 change 6572∗∗∗
vs. Model 1)
Notes. Signiﬁcant at the +p < 010; ∗p < 005; ∗∗p < 001; ∗∗∗p <
0001 level.
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Industry dummies
were included, but are not shown.
a ﬁrm engaged in giving. A one-year lag was used
between the dependent and the independent variables.
The results presented come from two ﬁrst-stage giving
choice models. Model 1 was a baseline model that con-
sisted of an intercept term and measures of ﬁrm-level
variables: Slack resources, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, debt ratio,
R&D, and advertising expenditures. Model 2 introduced
industry-level giving and industry dummy variables as
additional independent variables that were expected to
have an impact on a ﬁrm’s giving choices.
The results from the ﬁrst-stage analysis were consis-
tent with expectations. In Model 1, ﬁrms with a higher
level of slack resources were found to be more likely to
engage in corporate giving, whereas ﬁrms with greater
debt showed the opposite tendency. The coefﬁcients on
ﬁrm size and ﬁrm age had positive and signiﬁcant signs,
suggesting that larger and older ﬁrms are more likely to
engage in giving. Also consistent with our predictions,
R&D and advertising were found to positively affect
ﬁrms’ tendencies to engage in giving. In Model 2, the
coefﬁcient on industry average giving had the expected
positive sign. The change in 2, or the deviance, (657.2,
p < 0001) at the bottom of Table 2 indicates that
Model 2 had a better ﬁt. Therefore, the results from
Model 2 were used in formulating the inverse Mills ratio
for the multiple regression estimates presented in the
second-stage ﬁnancial performance model.
Second-Stage Financial Performance Estimates
Table 3 presents the results from the Heckman model’s
second-stage estimation using the inverse Mills ratio
from the probit model in Table 2 (Model 2) to account
for selection bias in the ﬁrms’ charitable giving data.
Panels A and B correspond to the models using the two
different measures of ﬁnancial performance—ROA and
Tobin’s q—as dependent variables. Hierarchical multi-
ple regression analysis was applied to the model in each
panel to test for the hypothesized curvilinear relationship
between corporate charitable giving and corporate ﬁnan-
cial performance, and the quadratic-by-linear interaction
between giving and industry dynamism.
Models A1 and B1 report the effects of a few basic
control variables: Lagged ﬁnancial performance, debt
ratio, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, and industry dynamism. Enter-
ing these variables into the regressions yielded signiﬁ-
cant equations for both ROA and Tobin’s q. Most of the
variables had the expected signs and signiﬁcant effects.
Lagged ﬁnancial performance and ﬁrm size showed pos-
itive and signiﬁcant effects on both measures of ﬁnancial
performance. Firm age was found to affect ROA pos-
itively, but revealed no signiﬁcant effect on Tobin’s q.
Firms with greater levels of debt tended to have lower
levels of ﬁnancial performance, particularly in terms of
Tobin’s q. On the other hand, industry dynamism did not
show a signiﬁcant effect on either Tobin’s q or ROA.
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Table 3 Estimates for Heckman Second-Stage Financial Performance Modelsa (Regression of Corporate
Financial Performance at t+1 on Firm and Industry Descriptors at t)
Panel A: Panel regression results for the effect of charitable giving on industry-adjusted ROA (with PCSEs)
DV: ROA
Variables
Models A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7
Intercept −0241∗∗∗ −0238∗∗∗ −0235∗∗∗ −0230∗∗∗ −0221∗∗∗ −0215∗∗∗ −0223∗∗∗
0046	 0046	 0046	 0046	 0047	 0047	 0047	
Lagged ROA 0801∗∗∗ 0800∗∗∗ 0800∗∗∗ 0798∗∗∗ 0792∗∗∗ 0788∗∗∗ 0791∗∗∗
0035	 0035	 0035	 0035	 0035	 0035	 0035	
Debt ratio −0006 −0006 −0006 −0006 −0006 −0005 −0006
0005	 0005	 0005	 0005	 0005	 0005	 0005	
Size 0012∗∗∗ 0012∗∗∗ 0012∗∗∗ 0012∗∗∗ 0012∗∗∗ 0012∗∗∗ 0012∗∗∗
0003	 0003	 0003	 0003	 0003	 0003	 0003	
Ageb 0499∗∗∗ 0497∗∗∗ 0496∗∗∗ 0491∗∗∗ 0485∗∗∗ 0476∗∗∗ 0479∗∗∗
0118	 0118	 0118	 0119	 0119	 0119	 0119	
Industry dynamism −0036 −0035 −0034 −0033 −0034 −0033 −0031
0031	 0031	 0031	 0031	 0031	 0030	 0029	
R&D 0283∗∗∗ 0275∗∗∗ 0261∗∗∗ 0257∗∗∗ 0250∗∗∗ 0254∗∗∗
0050	 0050	 0050	 0050	 0050	 0050	
Advertising 0090∗∗∗ 0090∗∗∗ 0085∗∗ 0085∗∗ 0087∗∗∗
0027	 0027	 0027	 0027	 0027	
Amount of giving/sales 0151 0840∗ 1094∗ 1077∗
0120	 0352	 0387	 0380	
(Giving/sales)2 −9204∗∗ −1379∗∗∗ −2134∗∗∗
3022	 3225	 4558	
Giving×dynamismc 0016 0039∗∗
0015	 0013	
Giving2 ×dynamismc −0251∗
0121	
Inverse Mills ratio 0069∗∗∗ 0064∗∗∗ 0062∗∗∗ 0060∗∗∗ 0057∗∗∗ 0057∗∗∗ 0052∗∗∗
0016	 0016	 0016	 0016	 0017	 0017	 0017	
N 4,019 4,019 4,019 4,019 4,019 4,019 4,019
F value 48130∗∗ 49963∗∗ 49911∗∗ 47701∗∗ 47215∗∗ 45297∗∗ 44317∗∗
R2 0684 0704 0714 0715 0722 0723 0727
R2 0020∗∗ 0010∗∗ 0001 0007∗∗ 0001 0003∗∗
Panel B: Panel regression results for the effect of charitable giving on industry-adjusted Tobin’s q with PCSEs)
DV: Tobin’s q
Variables
Models B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7
Intercept −1561∗∗∗ −1557∗∗∗ −1531∗∗∗ −1490∗∗∗ −1516∗∗∗ −1448∗∗∗ −1390∗∗∗
0363	 0364	 0365	 0363	 0364	 0365	 0366	
Lagged Tobin’s q 0777∗∗∗ 0776∗∗∗ 0775∗∗∗ 0774∗∗∗ 0765∗∗∗ 0756∗∗∗ 0752∗∗∗
0029	 0029	 0029	 0029	 0030	 0030	 0030	
Debt ratio −0202∗∗ −0201∗∗ −0201∗∗ −0201∗∗ −0195∗ −0181+ −0180+
0076	 0076	 0076	 0076	 0076	 0076	 0076	
Size 0100∗∗∗ 0096∗∗∗ 0096∗∗∗ 0096∗∗∗ 0089∗∗∗ 0086∗∗∗ 0086∗∗∗
0022	 0022	 0022	 0022	 0023	 0023	 0023	
Age 0002 0002 0002 0002 0002 0002 0002
0001	 0001	 0001	 0001	 0001	 0001	 0001	
Industry dynamism −0165 −0168 −0171 −0183 −0193 −0203 −0221
0311	 0311	 0311	 0311	 0311	 0312	 0312	
R&D 4555∗∗∗ 4254∗∗∗ 4366∗∗∗ 4295∗∗∗ 4298∗∗∗ 4284∗∗∗
0471	 0471	 0473	 0474	 0474	 0475	
Advertising 0638∗ 0629∗ 0575+ 0554+ 0549+
0302	 0302	 0302	 0303	 0303	
Amount of giving/sales −3001+ 1387∗∗ 1650∗∗∗ 1849∗∗∗
1572	 4740	 5019	 5231	
(Giving/sales)2c −0192∗∗ −0299∗∗ −0359∗∗
0070	 0103	 0109	
Giving×dynamismc 0395+ 0242∗∗
0234	 0101	
Giving2 ×dynamismc 4219
3967	
Inverse Mills ratio 0511∗∗∗ 0505∗∗ 0512∗∗∗ 0503∗∗∗ 0481∗∗∗ 0475∗∗∗ 0458∗∗∗
0146	 0146	 0147	 0147	 0149	 0149	 0150	
N 3,997 3,997 3,997 3,997 3,997 3,997 3,997
F value 48751∗∗ 52789∗∗ 52452∗∗ 50190∗∗ 50379∗∗ 48451∗∗ 47350∗∗
R2 0688 0716 0725 0726 0736 0738 0741
R2 0028∗∗ 0009∗∗ 0001∗∗ 0010∗∗ 0002∗∗ 0003∗∗
Notes. Signiﬁcant at the +p < 010; ∗p < 005; ∗∗p < 001; ∗∗∗p < 0001 level.
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses; b the coefﬁcients shown were multiplied by 103; c the coefﬁcients shown were multiplied by 10−3.
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In the subsequent two sets of models (Models A2 and
A3; and B2 and B3), R&D intensity and advertising
intensity were added into the equation. R&D and adver-
tising intensities consistently showed signiﬁcant positive
effects on both measures of ﬁnancial performance. When
ROA was used as the ﬁnancial performance measure,
adding R&D and advertising yielded increases in R2 of
0.020 and 0.010, respectively; the increases were 0.028
and 0.009 when Tobin’s q was the performance mea-
sure. The signiﬁcant increases in R2, and the results of
the F -tests suggest that the addition of each of the two
variables yielded a better-speciﬁed model.
In Models A4 and B4, the level of corporate giv-
ing was added to assess its possible linear effects on
ﬁnancial performance measures; it was found to have
no signiﬁcant effect on ROA. Its effect on Tobin’s q
was negative, but only marginally signiﬁcant (at p <
010). This failure to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant linear relation-
ship between corporate philanthropic giving and ROA is
consistent with the ﬁndings of previous empirical stud-
ies (Berman et al. 1999, Grifﬁn and Mahon 1997, Seifert
et al. 2004).
When the quadratic term for the giving amount was
entered in Models A5 and B5 to assess the possibility
of a curvilinear relationship with ﬁnancial performance,
however, the coefﬁcients on both the linear giving term
and the quadratic term were highly signiﬁcant for both
measures of ﬁnancial performance (at least at the p <
005 level). The positive coefﬁcient on the linear term
and the negative sign on the quadratic term are consistent
with the predicted curvilinear (inverse U-shaped) effect
of charitable giving on corporate ﬁnancial performance.
Further evidence of a quadratic charitable giving func-
tion is provided by comparing the variance explained
by the models. Including both giving and its squared
term led to increases in the R2 term (R2 0.007 and
0.010 in the two panels). F -tests on those models sug-
gest that adding the quadratic giving variable yielded
better-speciﬁed models. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was strongly
supported in terms of both performance measures.
In Models A6 and B6 and Models A7 and B7, the
linear and quadratic-by-linear interactions of charitable
giving and industry dynamism were added. When only
a linear interaction was added (Models A6 and B6),
the interaction of industry dynamism and the amount
of giving did not signiﬁcantly affect ROA, while the
interaction had a positive but only marginally signiﬁcant
effect on Tobin’s q. When a quadratic-by-linear inter-
action was then added (Models A7 and B7), the coef-
ﬁcient on the linear interaction in both models became
signiﬁcant with a positive sign. The coefﬁcient on the
quadratic-by-linear interaction was found to be negative
and signiﬁcant for ROA, but insigniﬁcant for Tobin’s q.
Furthermore, including the interaction term for indus-
try dynamism and giving-squared led to better-speciﬁed
models for both performance measures, because F -tests
Figure 2 Observed Moderating Effects of Industry Dynamism
on the Relationships Between the Level of Charitable
Giving and Corporate Financial Performance (ROA)
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on the changes in R2 suggested that the differences were
signiﬁcant.
These results provided some support for Hypothesis 2,
indicating that industry dynamism positively moderates
the inverse U-shaped giving–ﬁnancial performance rela-
tionship. To gain further insights into these moderating
effects, the relationship between corporate giving and
ROA and that between corporate giving and Tobin’s q
were plotted (Figures 2 and 3, respectively) to show
how industry dynamism moderates these relationships.
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that both the relationship
between charitable giving and corporate ﬁnancial perfor-
Figure 3 Observed Moderating Effects of Industry Dynamism
on the Relationships Between the Level of
Charitable Giving and Corporate Financial
Performance (Tobin’s q)
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mance (ROA and Tobin’s q), and the moderating effect
of industry dynamism are largely in the direction pre-
dicted in the hypothesis. The curvilinear relationships
between corporate giving and corporate ﬁnancial per-
formance became more pronounced with an increase in
industry dynamism. In both ﬁgures, the positive mod-
erating effect of industry dynamism seems to dominate,
because the same level of corporate philanthropy cor-
responds to better ﬁnancial performance when indus-
try dynamism is high. There is a notable difference,
however, between the two ﬁgures. Figure 3 suggests
that an inverse U-shaped giving–Tobin’s q relationship
is present at all levels of industry dynamism, although
the curve is more pronounced with high dynamism. In
contrast, Figure 2 does not show an inverse U-shaped
giving-ROA relationship in a highly stable (i.e., low
dynamism) operating environment. In fact, an increase
in corporate charitable giving is negatively associated
with ROA at a low level of industry dynamism, but this
relationship gradually turns into an inverse U-shape with
an increase in industry dynamism. This suggests that in
a very stable operational environment, corporate philan-
thropic giving, even at a low level, may not beneﬁt the
ﬁrm. Although corporate philanthropy still shows some
positive effect on market-based ﬁnancial performance
(as measured by Tobin’s q), it reduces accounting-based
measures of performance (as measured by ROA).
An additional issue of interest is the magnitude of
the effect of giving on corporate ﬁnancial performance
relative to that of other key variables included in our
analysis, such as R&D and advertising. Figures 2 and 3
compare the marginal effects on ﬁnancial performance
of R&D, advertising, and the level of giving. Note
that because both the scale and units are different
across these three variables, standardized coefﬁcients
were calculated for these variables to make them directly
comparable.4
For example, when ROA is used as a performance
measure (the chart on the left in Figure 4), the standard-
Figure 4 Comparison of the Marginal Effects of Advertising, R&D, and Giving on Financial Performance
(Left: ROA; Right: Tobin’s q)
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ized coefﬁcients (the slopes of the lines) for R&D and
advertising are 0.005 and 0.003, respectively. This sug-
gests that if ﬁrms increased R&D/advertising expendi-
ture by one standard deviation, ROA would, on average,
increase by 0.5% to 0.3%. At the mean level of giving,
the standardized slope is 0.003. Thus, R&D is associ-
ated with a higher level of ROA compared to advertising
and giving, while the latter two have similar impacts on
ROA. At higher levels of giving, however, the marginal
beneﬁt of giving falls below that of advertising. When
Tobin’s q is used as a performance measure (the chart
on the right in Figure 4), the standardized coefﬁcients
for R&D, advertising, and giving are 0.139, 0.023, and
0.056, respectively. Again, R&D has the greatest impact
on Tobin’s q. However, philanthropic giving (at the mean
level) seems to have a greater impact on Tobin’s q
than does advertising expenditure. Despite the decreas-
ing marginal effect of giving, this trend seems to con-
tinue beyond ﬁve standard deviations from the mean.
Figure 4 suggests that at the mean level of corpo-
rate giving, a unit of R&D provides greater marginal
beneﬁt than a unit of corporate giving. However, the
ﬁnancial effect of advertising is either similar to (in
terms of ROA), or smaller than (in terms of Tobin’s q)
that of corporate giving. The above results may also
suggest that there is some opportunity cost of philan-
thropic giving, especially in comparison to investments
in R&D. However, the existence of opportunity cost
is unlikely to eliminate the value of corporate giving,
because different types of investments are often comple-
mentary rather than substitutive. For example, without a
reasonable level of investment in other areas, including
advertising and corporate philanthropy, a ﬁrm may not
obtain as much beneﬁt from its R&D. Similarly, without
making any investments in other areas, corporate giving
might not bring a ﬁrm much ﬁnancial beneﬁt.
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Discussion
This study has argued that, on the one hand, corporate
philanthropy enhances a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance by
enabling the ﬁrm to gain greater control over stakeholder
resources. On the other hand, as the amount of phil-
anthropic contributions continues to increase, agency
costs and direct costs eventually become dominant. An
inverse U-shaped relationship between corporate philan-
thropy and corporate ﬁnancial performance was there-
fore predicted. This prediction was strongly supported
by analyses based on both accounting- and market-based
performance measures. Moreover, we found that the
inverse U-shaped relationship between corporate philan-
thropy and corporate ﬁnancial performance is stronger
in more dynamic industries.
These ﬁndings make a number of contributions to our
understanding of corporate philanthropy and corporate
social activity in general. First, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no previous study has so clearly demonstrated
the existence of the curvilinear relationship between
corporate philanthropy and ﬁnancial performance. Even
with respect to corporate social performance in gen-
eral, we are only aware of a few studies, including
Barnett and Salomon (2006), Bowman and Haire (1975),
and Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) that have alluded to
the possibility of a curvilinear relationship. This study
is therefore among the ﬁrst to provide detailed argu-
ments and strong empirical support for a curvilinear
relationship between corporate philanthropy and ﬁnan-
cial performance. The consistent pattern found using
both accounting- and market-based performance mea-
sures strengthens the results.
Second, the mechanisms through which corporate
philanthropy might affect ﬁnancial performance have
not been discussed in sufﬁcient detail in past studies
(Orlitzky et al. 2003, Rowley and Berman 2000, Ullmann
1985). We have articulated this process in detail, draw-
ing from, but further integrating and extending, previous
arguments. In particular, by building on and extending
previous arguments for a positive relationship between
corporate philanthropy and corporate ﬁnancial perfor-
mance (File and Prince 1998, Fombrun et al. 2000, God-
frey 2005, Saiia et al. 2003), this study has illustrated
how the positive ﬁnancial performance effect of corpo-
rate philanthropy might arise from greater stakeholder
cooperation and support and a resulting greater level
of security and control over critical resources. In addi-
tion, we have proposed some potential negative effects
of excessive corporate philanthropy on ﬁnancial perfor-
mance in terms of direct and agency costs.
Third, the ﬁnding that industry dynamism has a signif-
icant moderating effect on the philanthropy-performance
relationship suggests that a ﬁrm’s operating environment
plays an important role in determining the extent to
which it can beneﬁt from corporate philanthropy. As
Barnett (2007) and Rowley and Berman (2000) have
noted, it is important to examine the boundary conditions
that potentially change the relationship between corpo-
rate social performance and corporate ﬁnancial perfor-
mance. This argument and the supporting results are also
in line with a main tenet of contingency theory (Gal-
braith 1973, Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), which argues
that the effectiveness of a particular management prac-
tice depends on environmental factors. This study has
shown that ﬁrms operating in a highly dynamic envi-
ronment can gain greater beneﬁts from corporate philan-
thropy due to their greater resource dependence on their
stakeholders and the stronger signaling effect of a ﬁrm’s
positive image and reputation in dynamic industries. In
addition, the results suggest that corporate philanthropy
contributes to a ﬁrm’s management of environmental
uncertainty, which has not been emphasized previously.
Thus, this analysis helps paint a more complete picture
of the relationship between corporate philanthropy and
corporate ﬁnancial performance.
The results of this study have several implications for
managers. The ﬁndings suggest that the right question
for managers to ask is not whether corporate philan-
thropic contributions are uniformly good, bad, or neutral
for their ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial performance, but rather what
range of philanthropic contributions is most likely to be
effective. The results of this study suggest that it would
be helpful for ﬁrms that do not engage in corporate phi-
lanthropy, or that engage in an amount less than that
which would maximize their ﬁnancial performance to
be more actively involved in corporate philanthropy to
fully realize their ﬁnancial beneﬁts. To do so, managers
need to develop an understanding that corporate philan-
thropy is a way of doing business and that it is, in fact,
good business (Waddock and Graves 1997). In addition,
when they make decisions about philanthropic contribu-
tions, managers need to be more wary of stakeholders’
responses. Excessive philanthropy that cannot be read-
ily justiﬁed in the eyes of stakeholders may lead them
to withhold critical resources from the ﬁrm. Therefore,
when contributions are large, managers need to provide
credible justiﬁcations for their philanthropy to alleviate
stakeholders’ concerns.
To the extent that the effect of corporate philan-
thropy on corporate ﬁnancial performance changes with
the level of environmental turbulence, managers should
adapt the ﬁrm’s philanthropy accordingly. In particular,
given that ﬁrms operating in a highly dynamic indus-
trial environment beneﬁt more from active philanthropy,
managers of such ﬁrms may need to make every effort to
improve their public image by, for example, donating to
social causes and helping the needy to effectively con-
trol critical resources necessary for dealing with envi-
ronmental turbulence.
Much remains to be learned about the corporate
philanthropy–ﬁnancial performance relationship. First,
although resource dependency, the corporate reputation,
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stakeholder cooperation, and direct and agency costs
have been proposed as potential linking mechanisms
between corporate philanthropy and ﬁnancial perfor-
mance, these variables were not directly measured in this
study. The large number of ﬁrms included in this study
and its reliance on archived data prevented us from col-
lecting information on these variables. Thus, it would be
informative if, rather than inferring such linking mech-
anisms, future research could focus on a small number
of ﬁrms and directly collect data on these constructs
through, for example, survey methods and content anal-
ysis of mass media reports.
Second, as longitudinal data on other dimensions of
corporate social performance become available, it would
be useful to examine whether the effects on ﬁnancial
performance that we have found for corporate philan-
thropy hold across other dimensions of corporate social
performance. As noted by several authors (Grifﬁn and
Mahon 1997, Hillman and Keim 2001, Rowley and
Berman 2000), aggregating multiple dimensions of cor-
porate social performance into a composite measure may
limit our understanding of corporate social and ﬁnancial
performance. An investigation isolating each individual
dimension of social performance would be desirable.
We suggest that in addition to the databases commonly
used in evaluating corporate social performance, such as
the Fortune reputation survey or the Kinder, Lydenberg,
Domini and Company (KLD) index, other data sources
that provide more detail about each individual dimension
should be sought or developed (Harrison and Freeman
1999).
This study examined the moderating effect of industry
dynamism on the philanthropy–ﬁnancial performance
relationship, but it is reasonable to expect that other
industry- or ﬁrm-level factors may also affect this
relationship. For example, resource-based theories and
industrial economics may be integrated into the argu-
ments made in this paper to explore how the beneﬁts
of philanthropic contributions may vary with each ﬁrm’s
unique circumstances (McWilliams and Siegel 2001) and
other industry characteristics (Fry et al. 1982). Such con-
sideration of other possible moderators may shed light
on variations in the philanthropy-performance relation-
ship contingent on industry- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc features.
Our ﬁnding of a positive moderating effect of indus-
try dynamism also implies that ﬁrms operating in a
more dynamic environment should engage in more phil-
anthropic giving. This implication, however, does not
seem to be entirely consistent with the ﬁndings of some
previous studies. For example, building on resource
dependence theory, Berman et al. (2005) hypothesized
a positive relationship between industry dynamism and
several aspects of stakeholder relations (including the
community dimension, which is a construct close to
corporate philanthropy), but did not ﬁnd empirical sup-
port for this argument. Of course, these differences in
results may be explained by variations in the extent
to which ﬁrms focus on maximizing ﬁnancial perfor-
mance in making policies regarding their community
relations, perhaps due to noneconomic corporate goals
or mangers’ self-serving behaviors. However, it is possi-
ble that the difference in results could be caused by other
notable differences between these studies. For example,
are differences in data and methodology the sources of
the difference? Does corporate philanthropy differ from
other stakeholder dimensions in relating to a ﬁrm’s oper-
ational environment? Or does the hypothesized curvilin-
ear effect or the inclusion or exclusion of other control
variables cause the difference? Effort to more closely
explore the relationship among the operating environ-
ment, corporate philanthropy, and other dimensions of
corporate social performance is an avenue for future
research.
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Endnotes
1Although, according to traditional agency theory, sharehold-
ers are the primary principals that are concerned with manage-
rial misconduct (Berle and Means 1932), the argument can be
extended to other stakeholders such as employees, suppliers,
and customers. To the extent that these stakeholders have con-
tracts with the ﬁrm, they are also inﬂuenced by the behavior of
the ﬁrm’s managers and are concerned with managerial mis-
conduct. Thus, Hill and Jones (1992, p. 138) stated that “an
agency conﬂict is inherent in the relationship between man-
agement and all other stakeholders.”
2The number of observations used in the regressions may vary
slightly from this number due to occasional missing ﬁnancial
information used to compute other key variables.
3Because some recent research (e.g., Kristensen and Wawro
2006) has argued that PCSEs with lag speciﬁcation can be
problematic if observation-speciﬁc effects are not properly
controlled for, we performed ﬁrm ﬁxed-effect estimations as a
robustness test. Because ﬁrm ﬁxed-effect estimates can elim-
inate much of the selection bias (Campa and Kedia 2002,
Lafontaine and Shaw 1999), we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant sam-
ple selection parameter (inverse Mills ratio) using Heckman’s
two-stage model. We obtained consistent results for several
key variables of interest, although with somewhat weaker
effects. Detailed results of the ﬁrm ﬁxed-effect estimation are
available from the authors on request.
4Please note that because the relationship between corpo-
rate philanthropy and ﬁnancial performance is shown to be
curvilinear, the marginal change in ﬁnancial performance con-
stantly varies with the level of giving. However, given a cer-
tain level of philanthropic giving, we were able to compute
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the marginal increase in ﬁnancial performance (i.e., Giving +
22Giving ∗Giving, the slope of the curve at a certain level of
giving) and compare it with those of advertising and R&D.
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